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Abstract 
The inevitable implications of fragmenting farmland ownership are (i) uneconomic 
land sizes and farm operations, (ii) greater tendency to convert the farmland to other 
uses (and hence, the subsequent decline of food production capabilities of the country 
as a whole) and (iii) under-investment in the land as co-owners disagree on how land 
should be utilized. Fragmentation of ownership occurs in two ways, one is through the 
practice of distributing a deceased’s assets based on the literal application of the 
Fara’id calculations. Another is through formal and informal credit arrangements 
using land as a form of collateral. The implications of land fragmentation go against 
the government efforts to revitalize agriculture for trade and food security objectives. 
This paper evaluates land fragmentation problem in Malaysia and suggests policy-
improvement measures that can be adopted by the present land resource management 
authorities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most enduring and pervasive problem in the food production sector is uneconomic 
farm sizes. The Malaysian government has made various commendable efforts to provide 
technical support, R&D facilities, rural and farm infrastructure and so forth, yet these efforts 
still appears inadequate to curb the declining interest in food farming, particularly in respect 
to rice production. Cost of rice production in Malaysia is high due to decreasing pool of farm 
workers, higher fertiliser cost and not least, the problem of land speculation especially if the 
paddy land is located at the urban fringes. It would be hard to dispute that for a farm to be 
profitable in Malaysia, one of the pre-conditions would have to be reasonable operational 
sizes (apart from better mechanisation, market control and protection). In other words, 
widespread uneconomic farm sizes and continuous breaking up of existing plots would only 
jeopardise the sustainability of overall agricultural hectarage and output. Active smallholders 
(those who have not left agriculture voluntarily or due to old age) are usually trapped in the 
twin problem of small uneconomic production sizes and high land prices due to speculation. 
This meant that the farmers have very limited opportunities to expand even if they want to. 
At some point, they may even opt to withdraw from agriculture.  
The following statistics may help us appreciate the extent of land abandonment and 
fragmentation in the smallholder sector in Malaysia. The 1960 Agricultural census shows that 
59 per cent of all farms were less than 4 acres, and over 80 per cent of the rice farms were not 
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owned by cultivators. The period saw high rates of poverty and landlessness amongst the 
Malays. As at 1981, the Ministry of Agriculture identified 890,000 hectares of abandoned 
agricultural land and of that amount, 18% was rice land (Sahak, 1987). For the period 2001-
2005, the Ninth Malaysian Plan (p.85) still reports that 163,000 hectares are idle. Despite 
general interests seen in the media and in public discourses, the problem of abandoned land in 
Malaysia remains relatively unexplored, nor effectively resolved. Well-known causes of land 
abandonment include structural (uneconomic operation size, poor soil quality, insufficient 
water, elevation, access) or economic (cost of input, market power, price fluctuations) group 
of factors. This paper focuses on the factors that contribute towards uneconomic land size, 
which we believe contributes in a significant way to low agricultural returns and 
subsequently land abandonment.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides some overview of the changes 
in economic structure and consequently the changing emphasis on agriculture development. 
Section II goes into detail the two land fragmentation channels. Section III re-emphasizes 
certain strategies and proposes new ones to address the fragmentation of land while Section 
IV concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Economic diversification efforts which began in the 80‟s, witnessed the rolling back of public 
sector expenditures including for agriculture, to give way to private sector-led growth. A 
massive industrial development programme was duly launched, initially aimed at promoting 
import-substitution economic activities as well as agriculture‟s downstream industries. 
Various policies and incentives included in successive Industrial Master Plans were 
specifically tailored to reduce the cost of adjustment and time lag for the country‟s resources 
to be transferred, particularly land and labour, from agriculture to newer sectors especially 
manufacturing and heavy industries.  A great number of papers have been written about the 
near stagnation of agriculture, especially traditional agriculture, since 1980 by linking it to 
the “Booming Sector Syndrome” (see Kamal Salih for example, 1990).3 The economic 
transformation strategies paid off handsomely in the form of high growth rates in the period 
between 1987 and 1997 just before the Asian financial crisis. Malaysia also benefited 
immensely from its strategic location in the middle of the dynamic Asia-Pacific region to 
emerge as one of the region‟s Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs). However, it appeared 
that the transformation from an agriculture and mining-based economy to one that is 
industrial-based took place at such great speed that the agricultural sector, particularly the 
small agriculturalists, was not able to adjust and maintain their significance in the overall 
economy. Attention to agriculture faltered at almost all political, commercial and individual 
levels.  
Adverse commodity market conditions, smaller manpower pool and technological 
deficiencies continued to hamper growth in income from agriculture relative to that of the 
newer sectors, particularly in the 90‟s. This can be deduced from Figure 1 which showed the 
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rapid rate of decline in value of output from agriculture, hunting and forestry as a percentage 
of GDP between 1987 and 1997. By 1995, contribution of agriculture to GDP fell to half the 
level it was in 1987. The first and the second National Agricultural Policy (NAP)
4
 which 
were drafted to promote modernisation and commercialisation of smallholder sub-sectors had 
grossly underestimated small farmers‟ ability to adjust to the rapid changes occurring within 
and outside their communities and the attractive income from non-agricultural employment. 
The government also admitted to “leakages in the delivery of (agricultural) support 
programmes” (Sixth Malaysian Plan 1991:p. 104). To a great degree, land lost its importance 
as an investment instrument for the individual as the new economy brings forth a wider and 
more attractive array of investment opportunities to suit both hedging and capital growth 
requirements. New educational and employment opportunities which had been limited in the 
past considerably reduced interest in farm work, causing critical labour shortages for the 
farms. Table 1 shows that labour force engaged in agricultural, hunting and forestry activities 
almost halved within a span of ten years between the period 1987 to 1997 (from 28.6% to 
16.9%). 
Figure 1 Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry as Contribution to GDP (%) 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
Table 1 Agricultural Workers as a Percentage of the Labour Force   
Year 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
Total Labour Force 5431 6457 7319 8784 9886 10889 
Employment in Agriculture, 
Hunting and Forestry 1636 1846 1536 1481 1317 1437 
Percentage 30.1 28.6 21.0 16.9 13.3 13.2 
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Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
With respect to land, the period saw exponential growth in non-agricultural demand for land. 
Non-agricultural companies began to acquire large land stocks purely for capital gains and 
inflation hedging purposes; whilst more applications were made to convert agricultural land 
to commercial, residential or industrial lands. The seemingly unrelenting trend and the 
uncoordinated way agricultural land were approved for conversion brought far-reaching 
consequences on remaining agricultural interests.  Interest in food production was already 
weak both as far as the farmer and the public are concerned. In the 3rd Malaysian Plan (1975-
1980) document, the Federal government declared that they were ready to increase imports of 
rice if world prices continue to be lower than domestic prices.
5
 By 1993, the self-sufficiency 
target for rice was down to 65 per cent as the sector grapple with a declining supply of 
agricultural manpower and land resources. Figure 2 shows that the total rice planted area 
(from granary and non-granary areas) fell slightly in the early 80‟s then returned to previous 
levels but continued to stay constant despite increasing demands for rice from a growing 
population. It also useful to note that the rate of land expansion for the cultivation of food 
crops continued to lag far behind that of export crops (compare Figures 2, 3 and 4 for rice, oil 
palm and rubber hectarage growth respectively). Higher demands for food from the growing 
urban population did not translate into higher demands for local produce mainly because: (i)  
of cheap foreign imports and; (ii) the urban diet which was increasingly leaning towards 
foreign fads and cuisines which did not really involve local produce.  
 
Figure 2 Rice Hectarage in Granary Areas compared to Malaysia‟s Total 
 
 Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
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Figure 3  Oil Palm  Hectarage by type of Agriculturalist (1987 - 2008)  
 
 Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
 
Figure 4  Rubber Hectarage by type of Agriculturalist (1934 – 2006)  
 
 Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
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For agro-food sub-sector, Figure 5 compares rice production yields between the average 
farmers in the country versus farmers in the granary areas (who are more organised than the 
rest of the rice farmers). Rice production yields per hectare in the granary areas are almost 
double compared to average yields, although both areas display similar yield patterns over 
time. The figure demonstrates that a wide income gap exists between the smallholders and 
organised agriculturalists. The former are expected to be more vulnerable to shocks in the 
market for output or input and hence are more likely to sell their land or leave their farm 
uncultivated for more stable income sources. One the other hand, granary schemes‟ 
advantage lies in their large production area, which can be exploited more efficiently and 
more sustainably with mechanisation and better management to achieve higher yields rates.   
Figure 5 Rice Yields in Granary Areas compared to National Average (Kilogramme/Hectare). 
 
 Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
 
III. CHANNELS OF LAND FRAGMENTATION  
The Torrens land registration system introduced by the British in 1896 produced land titles to 
the Malays according to the area of land they were actively occupying and cultivating at the 
time; whereas foreign investors were given titles of large tracts of unoccupied land to 
stimulate a capitalist economy based on the lucrative rubber market. In other words, the land 
policies at the time created two separate classes of landowners: the large plantations and the 
smallholders. Over time, the latter group‟s land-per-person ratio became smaller as (i) some 
fractions of land were lost through informal credit systems or (ii) when the land is passed 
from one generation to the next. We describe the two fragmentation channels in the following 
sub-sections. 
I. Credit channel 
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In the traditional land system, „sale‟ of land typically involved paying pulang belanja or 
„returning expenses incurred on the land‟. The premise for this transaction is that the land 
never belonged to the vendor but the Creator, hence the vendor should be compensated only 
for his efforts to clear the land in the beginning plus whatever improvements he brought to 
the land over time (Fujimoto, 1983). In contrast, the Torrens system dictates that the 
registered owner of the land possesses full and indefeasible rights of the land‟s utilisation and 
disposal, whether in exchange with other goods or money. Since direct borrowing with 
interest is not allowed in the Malays‟ Muslim faith, and formal credit sources are almost non-
existent, a system of “conditional sale” was the popular mode of lending (Mohkzani, 1995). 
In this system of jual janji, a person „sells‟ his property for a sum of money and surrenders 
his land title to the buyer.  He would then be allowed to pay back the loan interest-free in 
instalments to regain ownership of the land. However, if the seller/debtor wished to continue 
working or staying on the land, he must enter into a supplementary contract in which the he 
became a tenant of the buyer/creditor. Defaulting on the loan and the rental would result in 
the land sale to be „complete‟ i.e., realised; or putus in the Malay language. Losing land by 
this method was not uncommon since the simple farming methods and uneconomic land size 
seldom left much surplus for loan servicing and rents.  
 Another form of farmer‟s credit involving land was the padi kunca system. Farmers 
often relied on middlemen for pre-harvest credit; for which re-payment was made during 
harvest time in kuncas (a volume measure) of rice. Because the price of rice is usually lowest 
at harvest time, one kunca of rice is valued less during harvest time than pre-harvest time. 
Usually the farmer had to surrender more kuncas to the creditor compared to the value of 
loan. Needless to say, this practice pushed the debtors deeper into debt. The creditors or 
middlemen would soon amass large amounts of land which they are neither able nor 
interested to operate in any efficient way (especially since the parcels are generally small in 
size and are scattered all over the area). These parcels are then leased to new individuals as 
tenanted land. Such land-based market for credit grew to correspond to the increase in the 
local population and influx of the more finance-savvy Chinese and Indians. The informal 
credit systems of jual janji and padi kunca were largely responsible for land concentration 
and the problem of landlessness and inequity in the society. The rate of land transfers from 
Malay interests to Chinese or Indian middlemen had become so worrying that by the early 
1950s, various forms of Malay Reservation land regulations were introduced by the state 
authorities to disallow designated Malay-majority areas from being transferred to non-Malay 
individuals.    
 
II. Inheritance channel 
Land titling has also caused significant changes to the way the land inheritance is recorded 
and executed. Many Muslims die intestate and this usually leads to complicated asset division 
issues. The Islamic law of inheritance laid down specific details of inheritance and shares of 
the whole estate allocated to the various types of heirs. For the Malays, in absence of other 
significant assets, a deceased‟s land must be distributed to all heirs according to their 
respective inheritance shares. This creates situations whereby two or more people inherit a 
title in various individual proportions as a result of which none can take ownership of the 
land until others have renounced their right to the inheritance voluntarily or in exchange of 
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other assets or payments (buy out the others‟ shares in the land). The title registration system 
allows co-ownership of land to be recorded on the title although partitioning the land is a 
possible option.    
If one of the heirs passes on before the land-partitioning or buy-out process is 
completed, then his or her heirs will be added to the existing list of heirs, although their 
collective share is limited to what is inheritable by their deceased father or mother in the first 
place. In some cases the number of heirs has become so large that many are no longer 
reachable for decisions. Naturally, the extent of transaction costs from negotiation and 
administrative procedures involved to obtain mutually agreed decisions regarding the parcel 
would be enormous. It would make sense to set up a firm to manage the land and assume the 
heirs‟ interests as shares in the firm, but this is only economically worthwhile if the land 
parcel is considerably large and highly productive. With respect to small holdings, the heirs 
usually find it more practical to sell the whole parcel collectively (regardless of the market 
price for land for a quick and swift solution) or partition the land. The latter move will allow 
the individual heir to independently decide what is to be done with their portion of the land. 
Ensuing co-ownership issues related with land fragmentation can sometimes turn very 
complicated, and in its extreme may prevent farming on the land altogether. Transaction costs 
(over and above the standard costs associated with land division or land assemble) to deal 
with unprofitable and so-called „problematic‟ landholdings have the effect of creating 
individual inertia that prevents agents from cultivating and transacting as much of the assets 
as they would like in that period or even forever; i.e. the market cannot reallocate land 
efficiently. Landowners or co-landowners may be forced to release their land earlier than 
necessary to „unload‟ problematic holdings and move on. On the other hand, buyers may 
refrain from „problematic‟ land parcels even if it is economically sized if they expect 
substantial delay and complications in securing full rights to the land. As a result, the market 
would eventually equilibrate at lower than competitive prices.  
Issues relating to co-ownership of land are not easily resolved even with intervention 
from government agencies. For instance, all co-owners must agree to surrender their 
decision-making rights to one of them through the use of Power of Attorney before the land 
can be included in government agricultural schemes. Obviously this is to ensure simpler 
negotiations and payment processes. However, not all in the family may agree or are 
interested in such long term commitments, not to mention are willing to bear the legal and 
administrative costs of registering their individual claims (particularly if their respective stake 
is very small and they are also very poor). In general, many would prefer a one-off payment 
from selling their stake in the land rather than annual dividends from the land‟s use. It is 
hardly surprising that a large number of inherited plots of land are left unsold and unutilised. 
It is reported that as of January 2007, there are unclaimed properties and land worth a total of 
RM330 million and approximately 1,000,000 land titles which have not been transferred to 
the rightful heirs either because they cannot be tracked or cannot come to an agreement to 
mutually benefit from the division of the estate (Amanah Raya Berhad, 2008). This problem 
is not exclusive to Muslims but to other ethnic groups as well since the level of awareness 
regarding estate planning is still very poor across the board.  
To illustrate, let‟s take a case where the original landowner passes away and leaves 
five acres of land for his heirs namely, one wife, one daughter, and two sons. If they literally 
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divide based on faraid system each of them will get their respective shares i.e., 1/8 for the 
wife, daughter 1/5 and two sons 2/5 respectively. Assume further that the land is then sold to 
a third party for a price of RM 15,000 per acre. On the other hand, if all the heirs agreed that 
instead of dividing the land, they could hold on the land collectively, continue to plough and 
cultivate it, and subsequently shares the earnings from the land. Suppose 5 acres of land 
generate produce of fruit which earn profit RM10,000 each year, in which case, the 
individual physical and financial shares on the land are shown in Table 2 below.  
Table 2: Inheritance shares and hypothetical share of the physical land 
Heirs Share 8 40 Share/5 
acres 
Price 
Received 
(RM) 
Earnings 
per Season 
(RM) 
Wife 1/8 1 5 0.625 acre 9,375 1,250 
First son Ashabah  14 1.750 acre 26,250 3,500 
Second son Ashabah  14 1.750 acre 26,250 3,500 
Daughter  Ashabah  7 0.875 acre 13,125 1,750 
By providing earning shares for the sister and mother in the family, this ensures their 
continuous and active participants in economic activities, plus they would be able to earn the 
same amount of money from selling the land in less than 8 years with capital land value 
appreciation. Indeed such outcome is in line with the purpose of faraid system which is to 
help the growth of economic activities, not to retard or reduce the value of the income-
generating asset, while ensuring that the land increases in value over time. It would be close 
to impossible for any of the heirs to acquire similar income-generating properties with the 
sale proceeds. This essentially implies destruction of capital as none are replaced. 
Nevertheless, the temptation of greater quantum of money although as a one-off payment can 
be difficult to resist. In some cases, relocation of people who were occupying the land is 
necessary, as the land is sold off.  
Should the co-owners agree to convert land in order to secure separate titles to their 
own portion of land, they must be willing to share the necessary administrative costs, 
including costs of re-surveying, valuation, legal, drawing up detailed plans for planning 
permission, premium for the new land category, and so on. The premium for conversion is 
basically payment to the state government for administrative costs and can be seen as a one-
off tax on the new land status. It ranges between 15 to 30 per cent of current market value of 
its new intended use. Private individual sellers are subject to real property gains tax, if they 
sell the land in less than 6 years. In addition, because of access and sewage land 
requirements, the sum of land owned by the heirs will be less than the total of land inherited 
initially. 
However, it must be stressed that the informal credit system and the land inheritance 
system are not flawed in themselves. For instance, the traditional credit system is no different 
with modern credit mechanisms in the use of land titles as loan collaterals. It is just that small 
farmers are more vulnerable to unpredictable weather and small profit margins such that their 
ability to repay loans is severely limited, hence the high rate of default.  The problem with the 
Muslim fara’idh inheritance system is not in its principles, but rather in its narrow execution. 
10 
 
A Muslim should exercise his testamentary powers where he can propose a reasonably fair 
distribution of his or her property in the event of his death and even allocate a maximum of 
one third of the property to non-heirs or charity. Transfer of assets to prospective heirs during 
the lifetime of the parent, especially if it concerns indivisible assets, is also encouraged most 
notably using the instrument of hibah and trusts. This can ensure that suitable amount of 
consultations and payments (if necessary) can be made.  In general, proper estate planning is 
will ensure that no one in the family is left financially deprived after the death of a person. 
Yet, „planning for death‟ is still taboo for most people particularly the older generation, as 
evidenced by the depressing statistics above.  
The foregoing discussions showed how the traditional credit system and inheritance 
principles became important land transmission mechanisms in the Malaysian context. As long 
as there is credit default involving land and as long as people are reluctant to adopt estate 
planning measures, one can expect land fragmentation to increase over the years. Such a 
situation would promote „excess surplus‟ conditions in the area‟s land market whereby the 
relatively smaller number of prospective buyers are able to exert their market power to push 
down prices.   
 
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 At the moment, there is very little visible effort by the states to protect agricultural land 
hectarage. In the state‟s pursuit of a broad-based and more resilient economic structure, it 
appears to be very amenable to expansion of cities as well as the development of new 
townships and industrial areas in traditionally greenbelt areas, as shown by the apparently 
„accommodating‟ attitude when dealing with agricultural land-use change applications. The 
market consequently behaves as if approvals are fairly easy to obtain and therefore price 
farmland largely based on this expectation. Value of farmland with perceptible development 
potential is typically far higher than a like-to-like parcel with purely agricultural potential. 
Because location is as important to agriculture as it is to most other economic activities, it is 
important that the government identify and preserve areas with highest  „use-capacity‟ in 
agricultural and relatively lower development pressures, where possible. Better regulations 
and enforcement space should be explored to ensure optimisation of land resource that would 
allow agricultural, forestry and other sectors to thrive well side-by-side. Approval of 
industrial, residential and commercial sites must fit into a larger and longer-term land-use 
plan. It should not be given haphazardly in order to protect prime agricultural areas from 
excessive speculation and development demand.  
Food production hectarage, particularly in the rice sector which suffered heavily from 
policy neglect in the past decades, are dwindling due to a multitude of factors: aging farmer, 
scarce and expensive labour, higher farm input costs, low farm-gate price, poor management 
and most importantly, small uneconomic sizes. The country has long been a net importer of 
rice, the country mostly produces only the lower and medium-grade varieties. Despite being 
the sector with the most number of support measures, these subsidies do not appear to have 
any effect in making rice farming attractive. Rice subsidies are generally linked to production 
costs support and incentive e.g. cash subsidies for plowing, fertiliser and machinery expenses, 
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yield improvement incentive (RM650 for every metric tonne exceeding the previous year‟s 
level) and additional price subsidy of RM 248.10 per tonne if the farm output is sold to 
government-associated rice mills.  The current Guaranteed Minimum Price stands at RM 
650.00, a rate that is reviewed very rarely. Ultimately, the profit margins to be made from 
rice-planting are too narrow, particularly for small farmers who do not benefit from 
economies of scale and particularly because higher costs of production cannot be passed on to 
consumers. It is possible to conclude that the subsidies are not capitalised into land price 
(which is expected since they are connected to crop rather than land) or even if they are, the 
effect is largely offset by the relatively unappealing rates of return.  
The National Land Code (1965) have sufficient provisions in Sections (117) and (127) 
to allow the state to step in as caretaker owner of abandoned land and eventually lease them 
to more efficient farmers. However, so far the states have been reluctant to exercise their full 
regulatory powers on land. Of course, sufficient opportunities should be given for more 
market-based measures as well as greater use of the media to locate absentee landlords and 
advertise for buyers. Where the problem is more widespread, block compulsory land takings 
could be initiated to ensure minimal problems with existing built constraints (too many 
structures or access roads in a unit of land) and ownership conflicts. This is also means that 
the land area can be reorganised into economic-sized lots of land and sold to interested 
farmers. 
In organised smallholder schemes where equity shares or wages are given to the 
participants instead of individual land titles, there is very little to tie the farmers to the land. 
Many hoped that their children would not continue as scheme participants particularly under 
such arrangements. There is a great deal of provisions in the collective agreements between 
the original participants and the agency that may not appeal to the second generation; and 
should therefore be revised to keep up with modern realities. At the end of the day, it may be 
best to leave the land to fewer but more efficient farmers. More importantly, the present 
group land schemes need to take a long term view to work out some „succession‟ mechanism 
that is mutually beneficial for both the family and the agency.  
Conversion of farmland at the urban fringes continues to be a critical issue for large 
cities. The apparently diffused pattern of development in Malaysian states is not entirely 
unintentional. The government embarked on various policies that deliberately aimed to 
spread development to areas which have been pre-dominantly agricultural and poor in the 
past. As cities become more congested and land prices rose continuously, consumers are 
increasingly willing to pay premium prices for low-density development in the suburbs and 
rural areas. Obviously, to limit speculation on land in traditional agricultural sites, approvals 
for new township developments must not be allowed or if it is, they should come with the 
strictest rules tailored to ensure the area‟s environmental sustainability and overall farming 
viability (e.g. proper buffer zones are established, rules on land sub-division, zoning and 
infrastructure additions are set up to ensure there is no conflict with agriculture‟s dominant 
place in the local economy). At the same time, government policies on urban renewal must be 
revised to find ways to restrict development to existing cities and town borders as much as 
possible. Politicians must discard the „bigger is better‟ mentality, and work to formulate 
policies that  encourage more efficient urban land use including considering greater 
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building density, re-development of city brownfields, improving the cities‟ mass transport 
network other urban amenities which can enhance quality and comfort of urban dwellers.  
As a whole, we strongly believe that the method of positive planning whereby state 
or local authority purchase or alienate land, lay out and service the land with infrastructure 
prior to selling the ready sites for specific purposes (even that in the form of leaseholds) 
should prevail over the usual ad hoc use-change approval methods. The recent proposals to 
pursue separate economic corridors for different economic sectors are in our opinion steps in 
the right direction. Instead of the focus on spreading development to balance regional growth, 
the government should encourage clustering of similar activities to maximise comparative 
advantage of the respective areas, promote economies of agglomeration and improve 
necessary logistics to suit the sector. Specific targets for the agricultural sector have included 
the setting up of permanent food production parks in each state, improving infrastructure to 
increase rice‟s yield/hectare rates in existing granary areas and shift to higher-value 
agricultural activities such as horticulture, agri-tourism and aquaculture. 
We have shown that in some cases, applications to convert agriculture land to 
development status can in fact be motivated by the regulatory conditions themselves. Two 
examples come to mind. Land legally classified as agricultural cannot be partitioned into 
plots less than 0.4 hectares. This makes resolution of shared ownership on small inherited 
lands rather difficult. Agricultural land is also no longer saleable to non-nationals after the 
country‟s independence. Although these restrictions are meant to curb further land 
fragmentation and excessive speculation, respectively, people are able to get around these 
restrictions simply by applying to have the land status changed to development. In the 
absence of (or lack of adherence to) a set of comprehensive and longer term land plans, the ad 
hoc approvals would promote haphazard land-use composition in the particular area. As 
Coughlin and Keane (1981) argued, even if relatively small portions of land are sold to non-
agricultural buyers, land values in the whole affected area will tend to rise, subject to the gap 
between agricultural and (the perceived) development rents from land.  
Regarding the fragmentation of land via the inheritance system, effective and 
inexpensive ways to resolve co-ownership issues without breaking up the land are either (i) 
still elusive or, (ii) not sufficiently promoted to the masses of (iii) ignored due to lack of 
political will and enforcement. To be fair, there are already various levels of arbitration 
avenues available to suit different needs: at the district land office, the courts as well private 
or semi-private bodies offering consulting services. It is particularly important that these 
authorities or agencies give priority to solutions that keep the land intact (although no doubt 
this would lead to a host of other issues). The process can be dreadfully cumbersome than it 
already is if family members are reluctant to cooperate and agree to find quick resolutions to 
the relevant matters, but is worth pursuing in order to promoting sustainability of agricultural 
land resources.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We argue that consequences from land fragmentation and complex co-ownership structures 
are partly responsible for the farm abandonment trends within the smallholders sector. 
Grossly uneconomic farm size (arising from continuous land fragmentation), particularly 
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those on marginal lands, usually mean very little surplus accumulation for productivity 
improvements or crop substitution in the future. Wide gaps in yield per unit of land between 
smallholders and larger agriculturalists underscore the fact that smallholders are particularly 
vulnerable to shocks in the input and output market, and thus are more likely to abandon their 
land or sell to the market when adverse margins persist (particularly when alternative income 
opportunities are now abundant in the new economic sectors). Land that is fragmented in 
ownership (e.g. if partitioned into smaller plots with single owners each) are seldom viewed 
favourably for loan financing or further investment purposes. As a result, the market may be 
saturated with many landowners of small parcels of land willing and eager to sell their land 
relative to the number of buyers wanting the lands.   
It is strongly believed that if policy-makers continue to be lenient and complacent 
with respect to the various land issues discussed above, there may be little chance of 
achieving the desired levels success of existing programmes to modernise agriculture and 
secure higher levels of food security.  It is extremely important to address known structural 
weaknesses in the agricultural sector in order to generate sufficiently attractive conditions for 
investments in agriculture. If agricultural land fragmentation does indeed contribute to 
uneconomic land sizes and farm operations, and greater tendency to convert the farmland to 
other uses (and hence, the subsequent decline of food production capabilities of the country 
as a whole) as well under-investment in the land, then policy intervention may be called for.   
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